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USES AND MISUSES OF DEADLY FORCE
Edward Ronkowski, Jr.*
Article Seven of the Illinois Criminal Code grants police officers wide dis-
cretion in their decisions to use, or refrain from using, deadly force to
protect themselves, to stop forcible felonies, to prevent escape, or to pro-
tect the public. Because the unintentional shooting of innocent persons
sometimes results from legal uses of deadly force, the Illinois Legislature is
presently considering bills which would eliminate some justifications for
the use of deadly force. In this Article, Mr. Ronkowski calls for the estab-
lishment of internal safety and policy rules within police departments, vio-
lation of which would lead to dismissal from the force. The author also
asserts that a police officer should operate under an affirmative duty to
restrain a fellow officer from using deadly force irresponsibly.
A police officer becomes "prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner'1 when
he commits a justifiable homicide in one of the six instances permitted under
Illinois law. Although the private citizen is also authorized to use deadly
force in prescribed circumstances, the citizen's power is less potent than that
of the police officer.
The decision to use deadly force requires critical judgment. The police
officer's failure to act can result in injury or loss of life to an innocent party.
Conversely, an officer's improper use of deadly force can result in dismissal
from the police force, civil liability, and criminal prosecution. Where the
legal justification for the use of deadly force is not apparent from the cir-
cumstances, either state 2 or federal3 court is an available forum for the in-
jured party.
Currently, the Illinois Criminal Code permits the use of deadly force in
the following instances: 1) to prevent death or great bodily harm; 4 2) to
prevent the defeat of an arrest by resistance or escape where the arrestee is
* Assistant State's Attorney, Will County, Illinois. B.S., University of Houston; J.D. De-
Paul University College of Law.
1. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 106 (1945).
2. See People v. Cash, 326 I11. 104, 157 N.E. 76 (1927) (police officer was convicted of
manslaughter for shooting at a fleeing motorist and thus killing a passenger, despite the officer's
defense that the motorist feloniously tried to run him over); Tutle v. Forsberg, 331 I!. App.
503, 73 N.E.2d 861 (1947) (officer held liable for illegally discharging his gun while attempting
to make a lawful arrest).
3. See Fults v. Pearsall, 408 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Tenn. 1975) (deputy sheriff who shot
plaintiff fleeing from arrest for misdemeanor was liable for violation of plaintiffis civil rights).
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-1 (1977):
Use of Force in Defense of Person. A person is justified in the use of force against
another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is
necessary to defend himself or another against such other's imminent use of unlaw-
ful force. However, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to
cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another, or
the commission of a forcible felony.
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either (a) committing a forcible felony, (b) attempting to escape by the use of
a deadly weapon, or (c) otherwise indicating he will inflict great bodily harm
unless arrested without delay; ' 3) to prevent a forcible felony; 6 4) to prevent
a felony in a dwelling; 7 5) to prevent an assault after a violent, riotous entry
into a dwelling; 8 or 6) to prevent an escape from a penal institution. 9 These
rights are extended to both police officers and citizens with the exception
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5 (1977):
Peace Officer's Use of Force in Making Arrest. (a) A peace officer, or any person
whom he has summoned or directed to assist him, need not retreat or desist from
efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the
arrest. He is justified in the use of any force which he reasonably believes to be
necessary to effect the arrest and of any force which he reasonably believes to be
necessary to defend himself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest.
However, he is justified in using force likely to cause death or great bodily harm
only when he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or
great bodily harm to himself or such other person, or when he reasonably believes
both that:
(1) Such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by resis-
tance or escape; and
(2) The person to be arrested has committed or attempted a forcible felony or is
attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon, or otherwise indicates that
he will endanger human life or inflict great bodily harm unless arrested with-
out delay.
(b) A peace officer making an arrest pursuant to an invalid warrant is justified in the
use of any force which he would be justified in using if the warrant were valid,
unless he know [sic] that the warrant is invalid.
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 7-3 (1977):
Use of Force in Defense of Other Property. A person is justified in the use of
force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such
conduct is necessary to prevent or terminate such other's trespass on or other torti-
ous or criminal interference with either real property (other than a dwelling) or
personal property, lawfully in his possession or in the possession of another who is a
member of his immediate family or household or of a person whose property he has
a legal duty to protect. However, he is justified in the use of force which is in-
tended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes
that such force is necessary to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-2 (1977):
Use of Force in Defense of Dwelling. A person is justified in the use of force
against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such con-
duct is necessary to prevent or terminate such other's unlawful entry into or attack
upon a dwelling. However, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or
likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if:
(a) The entry is made or attempted in a violent, riotous, or tumultuous manner,
and he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent an assault
upon, or offer of personal violence to, him or another then in the dwelling, or
(b) He reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent the commission
of a felony in the dwelling.
8. Id.
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-9 (1977):
Use of Force to Prevent Escape. (a) A peace officer or other person who has an
arrested person in his custody is justified in the use of such force to prevent the
escape of the arrested person from custody as he would be justified in using if he
were arresting such person.
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that citizens cannot use deadly force to prevent the defeat of an arrest or to
prevent an escape from a penal institution.10 In the Eighty-first General
Assembly, the Illinois Legislature considered several bills that would limit
those situations in which police use of deadly force is presently justified."
This Article will discuss the justifications for the use of deadly force in
Illinois and will focus upon judicial interpretation of the applicable statutes.
The proposed legislation will be examined and a preferable alternative will
be suggested.
THE POLICE OFFICER'S RIGHT TO CARRY FIREARMS
Before the justifications for the use of deadly force can be examined, the
extent of a policeman's right to carry firearms must be considered. By virtue
of his office, the police officer acquires special privileges to carry firearms
which the private citizen does not share. Only those public employees who
are required by their employment to make arrests and preserve public order
are considered police officers for these purposes. 12
One privilege vests police officers with authority to carry firearms within
their jurisdictional boundaries while on duty.1a Another privilege allows
(b) A guard or other peace officer is justified in the use of force, including force
likely to cause death or great bodily harm, which he reasonably believes to be
necessary to prevent the escape from a penal institution of a person whom the
officer reasonably believes to be lawfully detained in such institution under sen-
tence for an offense or awaiting trial or commitment for an offense.
10. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5 (1977) (authority given only to police officer to use
deadly force where necessary to make a lawful arrest); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-9 (1977)
(authority given only to police officer to use deadly force to prevent an escape from a jail or
penitentiary). See notes 5 & 9 supra.
11. House Majority leader Michael J. Madiagan introduced six bills offering different varia-
tions of the same statute. They are currently slated for interim study. See Bagley, The Use of
Deadly Force in Arrests, Chicago Daily L, Bulletin, Dec. 8, 1978, at 1, col. 1. [hereinafter
cited as Bagley]. The author reported that:
[T]he suggested changes ... [include] ... limit[ing] the use of deadly force by
police officers to crimes involving the use or threat of deadly force, or that [sic] a
delay in arrest will create a substantial risk that the suspect will cause death or
serious bodily harm. Other suggestions . . .[include] exclud[ing] burglary from the
definition of forcible felony-or at least non-residential burglary .... The purpose,
according to Madigan, is to allow for a full and open debate on the entire issue of
deadly force both in the public and legislative forum.
id. at 3.
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-13 (1977), defines a "peace officer" as "any person who by
virtue of his office or public employment is vested by law with a duty to maintain public order
or to make arrests for offenses, whether that duty extends to all offenses or is limited to specific
offenses". See People v. Perry, 27 I11. App. 3d 230, 327 N.E.2d 167, (1st Dist. 1975) (security
guards employed by housing authority were not "special policemen" and had same status as
private individuals, who have no authority to arrest citizens for ordinance violations). But see
People v. Picka, 44 I11. App. 3d 759, 358 N.E.2d 937 (5th Dist. 1976) (state university security
officers are peace officers within their specific jurisdiction as defined by statute).
13. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 24-1 (1977) (listing prohibitions of the use and possession
of firearms) and ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 24-2 (1977) (exempting policemen from pertinent
parts of § 24-1 and conferring upon officers the right to carry firearms).
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police officers to carry concealed firearms when not on their own land or in
their fixed place of business. 14  Additionally, police officers generally can
carry weapons over a wider geographic territory than private citizens. 15
Some state's attorneys have overbroadly interpreted these statutes and have
concluded that any off-duty police officer can carry his firearm loaded and
concealed anywhere within the state. 16 Although there is some confusion as
to whether or not guards are entitled to carry arms when off-duty, the Il-
linois Judiciary is clearly sympathetic to police officers and allows them wide
latitude in their right to carry firearms while off-duty. 17 Actually, the of-
ficer's privilege to carry weapons is limited to his jurisdictional boundaries
while on duty. 18 Thus, an off-duty police officer arresting a person outside
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 24-1(a) 4 & 24-1(a) 10 (1977) (footnotes omitted), states:
Unlawful Use of Weapons. (a) A person commits the offense of unlawful use of
weapons when he knowingly:
(4) Carries concealed in any vehicle or concealed on or about his person except
when on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business any pistol, revolver,
stun gun or laser or other firearm; or
(10) Carried or possesses in a vehicle or on or about his person within the corpo-
rate limits of a city, village or incorporated town, except when on land or in his own
abode or fixed place of business, any loaded pistol, revolver, stun gun or laser. or
other firearm.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 24-2(a)(1) (1977), authorizes an exemption from the above for police
officers:
Exemptions. (a) Subsections 24-1(a)(3), 24-1(a)(4) and 24-1(a)(10) do not apply to or
affect any of the following:
(1) Peace officers or any person summoned by any such officers to assist in mak-
ing arrests or preserving the peace while he is actually enaged in assisting such
officer.
15. Survey, Officers Carry Firearms, 29 ILL. POLICE ASS'N OFFICIAL J., Feb. 1976, at 62
(officers on duty can carry their firearms outside their jurisdiction in every state but North
Carolina).
16. See, e.g., C. Cavanaugh, in Model Test of the Illinois Firearm Training Program 34, at
question 125 (1976) (published by the Illinois Local Government Law Enforcement Officers
Training Board, 301 North Second Street, Springfield, Illinois) [hereinafter cited as Model
Test].
17. See Arrington v. City of Chicago, 45 Ill. 2d 316, 259 N.E.2d 22 (1970). In Arrington,
prison guards attacked ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 24-2(a)(4), which prohibited them from carry-
ing arms when not on duty. The court distinguished prison guards from police officers
A peace officer . . . has the duty to maintain public order wherever he may be; his
duties are not confined to a specific time and place as are those of a prison guard. It
is for this reason, and not because a peace officer may be subject to attack, that he
is allowed to carry a weapon at all times.
Id. at 24. See also People v. Barret, 54 Ill. App. 3d 994, 370 N.E.2d 247 (2d Dist. 1977), where
an off duty police officer working as a security guard in a retail store was deemed a peace officer
in execution of his duties when he arrested the defendants for assault and battery, and shoplift-
ing. The court cited Arrington and stated that an officer's duties are not constrained by specific
time or place limitations; and People v. Perry, 27 III. App. 3d 230, 327 N.E.2d 167 (1st Dist.
1975), where the court cited Arrington and stated that peace officers are required by their
employment to give full time to the preservation of public order.
18. See Nedrud, Officers Carrying Guns Outside Their Jurisdiction, I11. L. Crim. Investi-
gation, § A 3.3-8 (1978).
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his territorial jurisdiction possesses only the limited rights of a private citizen
to use deadly force. 19
WHAT IS DEADLY FORCE?
A discussion of deadly force usually focuses upon questions involving the
permissible use of firearms. 20 It should be noted, however, that the
employment of nightsticks, broken bottles, 21 tear gas, 22 bricks, 23 knives,
boots, 24 large vicious dogs 25 and even bare fists, 26 depending on how they
19. Cf. People v. Carnivale, 21 I11. App. 3d 780, 315 N.E.2d 609 (1st Dist. 1974) (police
officer acted with legal authority of a citizen in serving a warrant as he was outside of his
territorial jurisdiction), rev'd on other grounds, 61 I11. 2d 57, 329 N.E.2d 193 (1975).
20. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-8(a) (1977):
Force Likely to Cause Death or Great Bodily Harm. (a) Force which is likely to
cause death or great bodily harm, within the meaning of Sections 7-5 and 7-6,
includes: (1) The firing of a firearm in the direction of the person to be arrested,
even though no intent exists to kill or inflict great bodily harm; and (2) The firing of
a firearm at a vehicle in which the person to be arrested is riding.
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 24-1(a)(2); People v. Villabos, 53 I11. App. 3d 234, 368 N.E.2d
556 (1st Dist. 1977) (broken bottle is deadly weapon); People v. Fort, 119 I11. App. 2d 530; 256
N.E.2d 63 (1st Dist. 1970) (thrown bottle hitting the victim on the back of the head constituted
a deadly weapon).
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 24-1(a)(3), defines "a tear gas projectile or bomb or any object
containing noxious liquid gas or substance" as a deadly weapon. See Chaudoin v. Fuller, 67
Ariz. 144, 192 P.2d 243 (1948); Pfannenstiel v. Doerfler, 152 Kan. 479, 105 P.2d 886 (1940).
Illinois has not at present addressed the question of whether mace is a noxious liquid gas
under the statute. A California court, in Cook v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 4 Cal.
App. 3d 822, 84 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1970), found mace to be tear gas under a statute similar to that
of Illinois. But see Jackson v. City of Baton Rouge, 286 So. 2d 743 (La. Ct. App. 1973), where it
was held that mace was not a deadly weapon because the injury was minor and the arresting
officer used the chemical in lieu of his nightstick to subdue a drunk and disorderly defendant.
23. People v. Williams, 56 I11. App. 2d 159, 205 N.E.2d 749 (1st Dist. 1965) (brick thrown
by a gang of youths at a passing cab constituted deadly force). See State v. Lee, 36 Del. 11, 171
A. 195 (1933) (a brick thrown with force and violence in close proximity to the person of another,
or used as a weapon to strike by holding it in hand, is a deadly weapon); Peats v. State, 213 Ind.
560, 12 N.E.2d 270 (1938) (stone or brick thrown from a car travelling seventy miles per hour
through an oncoming truck's windshield was deadly force).
24. People v. Driver, 62 I11. App. 3d 847, 379 N.E.2d 840 (4th Dist. 1978) (defendant's
repeated kicking of fallen police officer constituted deadly force). See Commonwealth v. Bel-
monte, 351 N.E.2d 559 (Mass. App. 1976) (three defendants' repeated kicking of fallen officer
held to be assault and battery with a deadly instrument); People v. Rumaner, 45 App. Div. 2d
290, 357 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1974) (defendant found guilty of assault with a dangerous instrument
when he kicked fallen bartender ten or twelve times in the face with heavy leather boots).
Contra, Dickson v. State, 230 Ark. 491, 323 S.W.2d 432 (1959) (shoes that a person wears as
part of his apparel are not deadly weapons within the meaning of the statute defining such).
25. See People v. Torrez, 86 Misc. 2d 369, 382 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1976). Although the Torrez
court did not view a vicious dog as a deadly weapon, its characterization of a German shepard as
a dangerous instrument suggests that in the proper circumstances a court may find a vicious dog
to be an instrument of deadly force.
26. People v. Swiontek, 391 Ill. 618, 63 N.E.2d 741 (1945) (defendant convicted of murder
for beating and kicking victim to death); People v. Horne, 110 Ill. App. 2d 167, 249 N.E.2d 282
(1st Dist. 1969) (beating with fists and kicking can result in and constitute murder).
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are used, can constitute deadly force. The important variables are the force
with which the instruments are used and the strength of the user. If the
force and the strength of the aggressor are great enough, any object can be
used in a manner constituting deadly force. 2 7  The use of firearms alone,
however, almost categorically will be construed as deadly force, irrespective
of the force and strength variables. In fact, a police officer's mere discharge
of a firearm in the direction of a person to be arrested or at the arrestee's
vehicle is deadly force per se, 28 regardless of the officer's intent. Thus, a
police officer was convicted of voluntary manslaughter when he killed a flee-
ing speeder with what was intended to be a warning shot.
2 9
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR USE OF DEADLY FORCE IN ILLINOIS
Each justification for the use of deadly force in Illinois requires the actor
to proceed on the basis of "[a reasonable belief] that deadly force is neces-
sary to prevent" some prescribed illegal act.3 0  This requirement defines the
right to use deadly force and establish the boundaries of the ,privilege.
Reasonable Belief Requirement
In Illinois, the police officer or citizen is protected if he reasonably be-
lieved that the use of deadly force was necessary. 3 ' The perceived danger
need not be real,3 2 and a person under great stress and excitement is not
required to use infallible judgment in the space of a few seconds.3 3
27. See People v. Carter, 410 I11. 462, 465, 102 N.E.2d 312, 313 (1951), where the Illinois
Supreme Court stated:
A deadly weapon is not necessarily manufactured for the special purpose of taking
animal life, nor need it be of any certain size or description. This court has defined
a deadly weapon as "an instrument that is used or may be used for the purpose of
offense or defense and capable of producing death. Some weapons are deadly per
se; others, owing to the manner in which they are used, become deadly, while a
small pocket knife, a cane, a riding whip, a club or baseball bat may be so used as
to be a deadly weapon .. " Those instrumentalities not considered deadly per se
may thus clearly become such by the manner in which they are used.
See also People v. Drumheller, 15 I11. App. 3d 418, 421, 304 N.E.2d 455, 458 (2d Dist. 1976)
(because size and strength disparity was so great, a blow from defendant's bare fist to a four-
teen-month-old child constituted deadly force).
28. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-8(a) (1977).
29. People v. Klein, 305 I11. 141, 137 N.E. 145 (1922).
30. ILL. 1Ev. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 7-1, -2, -3, -5, -9 (1977). See notes 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 supra.
31. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-1 (1977); People v. Lockett, 85 11. App. 2d 410, 414, 229
N.E.2d 386, 387-88 (1st Dist. 1967).
32. People v. Kelly, 24 I11. App. 3d 1018, 322 N.E.2d 527 (2d Dist. 1975); People v. Brum-
beloe, 97 Ill. App. 2d 370, 240 N.E.2d 150 (1st Dist. 1968); People v. Lockett, 85 111. App. 2d
410, 229 N.E.2d 386 (1st Dist. 1967).
33. People v. Lenzi, 41 111. App. 3d 825, 355 N.E.2d 153 (1st Dist. 1976) (person
threatened by several bullies does not have time to reason out every response he should make
or to judge precisely how much force he has to use to repel the attack and ensure his safety);
People v. Harling, 29 I11. App. 3d 1053, 331 N.E.2d 653 (1st Dist. 1975) (because defendant's
[Vol. 28:701
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Nevertheless, a fine line distinguishes the legally protected reasonable belief
and the unprotected mere suspicion. 34 Under current Illinois law, a reason-
able belief justifying the use of deadly force in defense of oneself or another
generally will not be found until a weapon is actually observed. However,
where the person against whom the force is directed is known to carry a
weapon, or indicates that he is carrying a weapon on his person and makes a
move to use it, an exception to this general rule will lie.3 5
Judicial interpretations often confuse the "reasonable belief' requirement.
The Illinois statute indicates that a reasonable belief based on either an ac-
tual or apparent danger will justify the use of force necessary to prevent
either imminent death or great bodily harm. 36  However, decisions in other
states with similar justifiable-use-of-force statutes have suggested that only
the actual, as opposed to the apparent, facts are relevant in determining
whether a belief was reasonable. 37
Illinois decisions, nevertheless, appear to follow the preferred construction
of the statute. In People v. Morgan, 38 the appellate court for the first district
reversed the voluntary manslaughter conviction of a detective agency em-
ployee who had killed a disorderly waiter. The court noted that the waiter
had attempted to remove something from his pocket after mentioning he
had a gun, and it concluded that the detective may have labored under a
belief that his conduct was necessary to save himself from death or greatly bodily harm was a
reasonable one, he was not required to use infallible judgment in the space of a few seconds
while he was under great stress and excitement).
34. Compare People v. Munguia, 33 I11. App. 3d 880, 330 N.E.2d 574 (2d Dist. 1975), and
People v. Smith, 58 II1. App. 3d 784, 374 N.E.2d 1285 (lst Dist. 1978), with People v. Reeves,
47 111. App. 3d 406, 362 N.E.2d 9 (5th Dist. 1977), and Fortunto v. Police Board of Chicago, 38
I11. App. 3d 950, 349 N.E.2d 521 (lst Dist. 1976). In Munguia, the defendant was found guilty
of voluntary manslaughter when he extricated himself from a fight in a bar and later returned
armed with a knife. The fight was resumed and defendant's belief that deadly force was neces-
sary to protect himself and a friend was held unreasonable, particularly because the victim's
resumed aggression may have been provoked by the defendant's return with a knife. In Smith,
the court held that mere disparity in size and verbal threats did not allow the defendant, who
was standing in the street, to shoot a man seated in a car who had threatened him while holding
a screwdriver. Contrarily, the Reeves court held that a wife who shot her husband as he drag-
ged, beat, and threatened her was justified in the use of deadly force even though her husband
was unarmed. The court relied on the fact that she had in the past been hospitalized as a result
of beatings inflicted by her husband. In Fornuto, an escaping suspect turned on an officer in hot
pursuit and lunged at him with a knife. The officer sidestepped the lunge and then shot the
suspect in the back. At trial, there was a question as to whether the victim was running away
when shot or whether he was still close enough to present an imminent threat to the officer.
The court held, in part, that because only a few seconds had elapsed between the attack and
the retaliation, infallible judgment was not required of the officer.
35. People v. Morgan, 114 I11. App. 2d 421, 252 N.E.2d 730 (lst Dist. 1969).
36. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-1 (1977).
37. See the often cited case of Commonwealth v. Duerr, 158 Pa. Super. 484, 492, 45 A.2d
235, 239 (1946) (the felony in fact must actually be committed). See also Petrie v. Cartwright,
114 Ky. 103, 70 S.W. 297 (1902).
38. 114 Ill. App. 2d 421, 252 N.E.2d 730 (1st Dist. 1969).
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reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary to protect himself. The
waiter was later determined to be unarmed. Illinois appellate courts have
stated that in this type of situation the actual presence of a gun is theoreti-
cally immaterial; the words coupled with the directed action support the
reasonable belief of danger. 39 However, in 1890 the Illinois Supreme Court
effectively prohibited the use of deadly force where there is no indication of
the presence of a weapon. 40  For example, if a suspect merely reaches to-
ward his pocket, 4' or draws his hand from below his waist, as if drawing a
weapon, 42 or places his hand in his pocket without mention of a weapon, the
use of deadly force is not justified.
The perceptions that form the basis of a reasonable belief need not be
limited to the instant circumstances. For example, in People v. Honey,4 3 the
first district appellate court reversed a civilian defendant's manslaughter
conviction in consideration of his prior antagonistic encounters with the de-
ceased. The defendant had engaged in a fist fight with the deceased five
days before the fatal shooting. On the following day, the decedent
threatened the defendant with a gun, but the defendant fled unharmed.
Three days later they scuffled. The decedent, while rushing defendant with
his hand in the same pocket from which he had produced the gun previ-
ously, again threatened to kill the defendant. The court found the defend-
ant's perception to be reasonable at the time he used deadly force, even
though a later search showed the deceased had been unarmed. Honey thus
illustrates an exception, based on the existence of prior armed encounters, to
the general rule that mere movement toward a pocket, absent mention of a
weapon, cannot justify the use of deadly force. 4 4
Compare Honey with People v. Millet, 45 where threats accompanied by
the antagonist's fumbling inside a car trunk were held insufficient to justify
three shots in the back. The first district appellate court reasoned that Millet
should have waited until he actually saw a weapon or until his antagonist
faced him with one.
39. See People v. Diaz, 38 II1. App. 3d 447, 348 N.E.2d 199 (1st Dist. 1976) (decreased
need not be armed in order for a person to entertain a reasonable belief of danger); People v.
Adams, 113 II1. App. 2d 205, 252 N.E.2d 35 (1st Dist. 1969) (same).
40. Walker v. People, 133 I11. 110, 24 N.E. 424 (1890).
41. People v. Scimeni, 316 III. 591, 147 N.E. 484 (1925); People v. Pietrzyk, 54 I11. App. 3d
738, 369 N.E.2d 1299 (1st Dist. 1977).
42. People v. Carter, 3 I11. App. 3d 121, 278 N.E.2d 209 (1st Dist. 1971). The antagonist
jumped off his bar stool and struck the defendant bartender in the face hard enough to force
him backwards against the rear area of the bar. The bartender grabbed a gun and fired two
warning shots in the air. The antagonist then began to draw his hand from below the level of
the bar as if he were drawing a weapon. The bartender fired into him thinking his hand con-
tained a weapon. The court upheld the bartender's conviction because he had fired absent a
reasonable belief that the antagonist's hand contained a weapon capable of causing great bodily
harm to the bartender.
43. 69 I11. App. 2d 429, 217 N.E.2d 371 (1st Dist. 1966).
44. See notes 39-41 and accompanying text supra.
45. 60 I11. App. 2d 22, 208 N.E.2d 670 (1st Dist. 1965).
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Necessity
Prior to 1961, Illinois statutes permitted deadly force to be used only
when "absolutely necessary." Thus, deadly force was justified only if used as
a last resort.4 6 The inherent danger in the "last resort" policy was that it
brought the innocent citizen or police officer perilously close to loss of his
own life.
47
Two factors contributed to a more practical interpretation of the word
necessary." First, the self-defense statute was amended to eliminate the
word "absolutely" with respect to necessity. 48  Second, the requirement that
all other alternatives be exhausted was ameliorated in the case law, indicat-
ing a judicial recognition that one faced with threatened force may not have
time to consider every possible response or judge precisely how much force
should be used to repel an attack or ensure safety. 49
Currently, courts concentrate on whether the overall situation prompted a
belief in the necessity of deadly force 50  The courts' fundamental query
46. People v. Stapleton, 300 I11. 471, 133 N.E. 224 (1921) (accused may use deadly force
only if he has a reasonable and well-grounded belief that he is actually in danger of losing his
life or receiving great bodily harm). The old statute, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 367 (1959),
containing the "absolutely necessary" requirement, was replaced in 1961. See note 48 and ac-
companying text infra.
47. See People v. Stapleton, 300 II1. 471, 133 N.E. 224 (1922). After being struck, knocked,
and kicked by his victim, defendant Stapleton went home for his revolver and met the victim
again. The defendant told the victim they were friends, but the victim put his hand into his
pocket and pulled out his revolver. About shooting and killing the victim, defendant stated that
he honestly believed he was in actual dange of being killed or receiving great bodily harm. The
court reversed defendant's conviction, stating that the use of deadly force is justified if the
circumstances are such to induce in the defendant the belief that he is actually in present
danger of receiving great bodily harm or of losing his life. Apparent necessity would not be
sufficient to provoke the use of deadly force and the court stated that the fear should be that
which a reasonable person would have under the circumstances.
As recently as 1966, the appellate court for the first district aflirmed a conviction for murder
and stated that killing in self defense was justified only when "absolutely necessary" to save the
actor's own life or prevent great bodily harm. Victim's pushing the defendant and advancing
toward him with a board did not justify defendant's use of a revolver in self-defense. People v.
King, 76 I11. App. 2d 354; 222 N.E.2d 88 (1st Dist. 1966).
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-1 (1977), replacing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 367 (1959):
Use of Force in Defense of Person. A person is justified in the use of force against
another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is
necessary to defend himself or another against such other's imminent use of unlaw-
ful force. However, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to
cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another, or
the commission of a forcible felony.
49. People v. Lenzi, 41 111. App. 3d 825, 355 N.E.2d 153 (1st Dist. 1976). See note 33 and
accompanying text supra.
50. People v. Schwartz, 11 I1. App. 3d 959, 297 N.E.2d 671 (1st Dist. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 58 Il1. 2d 274, 319 N.E.2d 23 (1974) (a reasonable belief must necessarily depend
upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the situation). See People v. Broumas, 24 I1.
App. 3d 32, 320 N.E.2d 440 (1st Dist. 1974), for a more recent statement of the grounds for
justifiable use of deadly force in Illinois).
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when determining whether deadly force was necessary in a given situation
is: did the defendant make some attempts to avoid the peril? 5 1 An actor's
failure to consider individual factors will not be decisive in a determination
of the necessity issue. However, in determining whether the overall situa-
tion necessitated the use of deadly force, courts often consider whether an
attempt at avoidance was made.
The necessity requirement also regulates the kind and amount of force
that can be used to repel aggression. Thus, if an antagonist threatens a small
amount of force, only a slightly greater amount of force can be used to repel
the aggression.5 2 One who is legally justified in using force, however, is not
required to afford a criminal violator the opportunity of a fair and equal
struggle. Greater force may be employed as needed to prevent the aggres-
sion. 53 For example, if an antagonist draws a knife, a firearm can be
pointed as a deterrent. If a knife-wielding antagonist approaches within lung-
ing distance and refuses to stop, deadly force can be used in self-defense.
54
Consequently, as soon as the circumstances warrant a reasonable belief that
great bodily harm is imminent, the use of deadly force is considered neces-
sary. 55
When the requirement of necessity is applied in the setting of an im-
mediate physical confrontation, even the most agile person cannot be ex-
pected to measure accurately the exact amount of force necessary to repel a
danger. Thus, given emergency circumstances, only a gross disparity in the
parties' use of force will warrant the imposition of civil or criminal sanc-
tions. 56 These life-threatening situations often offer the choice of either re-
51. People v. Jordan, 18 I11. 2d 489, 165 N.E.2d 966 (1960) (to justify the use of deadly
force for self-defense, defendant must show a good faith endeavor to decline further struggle
before the mortal blow is given); People v. Adams, 113 I11. App. 2d 205, 216, 252 N.E.2d 35,
41 (1st Dist. 1969) (while defendant had no duty to retreat, he showed no attempt to avoid peril
in any way before dealing the fatal blows; manslaughter voniction affirmed).
52. People v. Johnson, 35 III. App. 3d 215, 340 N.E.2d 673 (1st Dist. 1975) (seLf-defense is
not available to defendant where initial aggressor retreats from the conflict and defendant as-
sumes the role of aggressor); People v. Johnson, 33 I11. App. 3d 957, 338 N.E.2d 895 (5th Dist.
1975) (right to defend oneself does not permit pursuit and injury of aggressor afler aggressor
abandons the conflict).
53. People v. Williams, 56 I11. App. 2d 159, 205 N.E.2d 749 (1st Dist. 1965) (brick thrown
by a gang of youths who were beating their robbery victim, striking a passing cab, constituted
deadly force and justified cab driver's retaliation with a firearm). See North Carolina v. Gosnell,
74 F. 734, 738 (1896) (where defendant used rock in attempt to resist arrest by police officer,
police officer was justified in shooting defendant to prevent imminent danger of serious bodily
harm to himself).
54. People v. Rorer, 44 I11. App. 3d 553, 358 N.E.2d 681 (5th Dist. 1976) (defendant con-
victed of murder for killing an approaching individual who was brandishing a knife, but convic-
tion reversed'on grounds that evidence also showed an accidental homicide). See Scott v. Com-
monwealth, 301 Ky. 127, 131, 190 S.W.2d 345, 347 (1945) (not required to await the thrust of a
knife).
55. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-1 (1977).
56. People v. Harris, 124 I11. App. 2d 234, 260 N.E.2d 325 (1st Dist. 1970) (where deceased
advanced toward defendant during loud discussion, and it did not appear that deceased had any
[Vol. 28:701
1979] DEADLY FORCE
taliation or retreat. Police officers generally do not have the second option
because of their legal duty to effectuate an arrest, 57 and because they are not
required to retreat in the face of resistance to an arrest. 58  Similarly, a pri-
vate citizen need not retreat in the face of a deadly threat. 59
As the level of danger changes from moment to moment, the need for
resorting to deadly force also changes. In People v. McBride,"0 for example,
an argument between a hotel night clerk and defendant ended in a fist fight.
The night clerk drew a pistol and a struggle ensued. Defendant then dis-
armed the night clerk and the struggle continued until defendant gained
control of the pistol and killed the clerk. In affirming defendant's conviction,
the first district appellate court reasoned that one is not ordinarily justified
in shooting an antagonist after he has been disarmed or disabled. 61
In addition to alternating levels of danger, the relative size and health of
the parties can determine the need for resort to deadly force. In Schnepf v.
weapon, defendant's use of a firearm was unjustified); People v. Pursley, 302 Il1. 62, 134 N.E.
128 (1922) (attempted by deceased to strike accused with his fist did not justify the latter's
meeting the assailant with a knife). Contra, People v. Dowdy, 21 111. App. 3d 821, 316 N.E.2d
33 (1st Dist. 1974) (an assailant's use of fists can justify defendant's use of a firearm in self
defense).
57. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-13 (1977):
"Peace officer" means any person who by virtue of his office or public employ-
ment is vested by law with a duty to maintain puboic order or to make arrests for
offenses, whether that duty extends to all offenses or is limited to specific offenses.
See Lynn v. People, 170 I11. 527, 48 N.E. 964 (1898); State v. Dunning, 177 N.C. 559, 98 S.E.
530 (1919) (shooting misdemeanant who threatened officer with a knife allowed even though
officer could have avoided injury by retreating).
58. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5(a) (1977):
Peace Officer's Use of Force in Making Arrest. (a) A peace officer, or any person
whom he has summoned or directed to assist him, need not retreat or desist from
efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the
arrest. He is justified in the use of any force which he reasonably believes to be
necessary to effect the arrest and of any force which he reasonably believes to be
necessary to defend himself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest.
However, he is justified in using force likely to cause death or great bodily harm
only when he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or
great bodily harm to himself or such other person, or when he reasonably believes
both that:
(1) Such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by resis-
tance or escape; and
(2) The person to be arrested has committed or attempted a forcible felony or is
attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon, or otherwise indicates that he will
endanger human life or inflict great bodily harm unless arrested without delay.
See also Moore v. Chicago Police Board, 42 Ill. App. 3d 343, 347-48, 355 N.E.2d 745, 749 (lst
Dist. 1976); Migliore v. County of Winnebago, 24 I11. App. 3d 799, 802-03, 321 N.E.2d 476,
478-79 (2d Dist. 1974).
59. People v. Vance, 53 Ill. App. 3d 573, 368 N.E.2d 758 (1st Dist. 1977); People v. Har-
ley, 24 I11. App. 3d 1053, 331 N.E.2d 653 (1st Dist. 1975); People v. Williams, 57 Ill. App. 2d
239, 311 N.E.2d 681 (1974).
60. 130 I11. App. 2d 201, 264 N.E.2d 446 (1st Dist. 1970).
61. Id. at 208, 264 N.E.2d at 450.
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Grubb,62 a nineteen-year-old, 175-pound, physically strong suspect, beat a
76-year-old sickly police officer with the officer's own night stick. During
the later arrest, he kicked and struck the same officer in the face. A week
later, the same boy, who had a reputation of resisting arrest and fighting
with officers, unexpectedly emerged from a vehicle and approached the of-
ficer. He ignored three commands to halt. The police officer, apparently
fearing he was going to receive another severe beating, shot and killed his
previous assailant. While there was another younger officer some twenty feet
away, the court reasoned that his presence could not have prevented the
quick, severe blows or kicks that might have caused great bodily harm to the
elderly officer. Consequently, deadly force was deemed reasonably necessary
because of the physical disparities. However, if the officer had not tried to
warn the suspect away, he would probably have been held liable for the
improper use of deadly force. 63
The necessity requirement governs not only the actual decision to dis-
charge a firearm and the amount of force that can be used, but also prohibits
the unnecessary drawing and pointing of a firearm. However, in a potentially
dangerous situation, the decision to have a weapon ready for use is usually
left to the discretion of the police officer 64 or citizen. Criminal or civil liabil-
ity for assault can result from prematurely drawing or pointing a firearm if
there is no reasonable potential for violence. 6 5  However, courts recognize
that a police officer must be equipped with the confidence to act quickly in
an emergency, and accordingly do not severely regulate a policeman's right
to draw his weapon. 66 A weapon may be displayed and pointed before a
person is justified in shooting. 67 Thus, a firearm can be drawn and pointed
at an approaching assailant who is bearing a dangerous knife before the as-
sailant reaches lunging distance. Yet, only upon reaching the lunging point
may the knife-bearing assailant be shot in self-defense.
62. 125 I11. App. 2d 432, 261 N.E.2d 47 (4th Dist. 1970).
63. See People v. Broumas, 24 Ill. App. 3d 32, 36, 320 N.E.2d 490, 493 (lst Dist. 1974)
(court affirmed conviction because defendant citizen failed to warn assailant away).
64. People v. Attaway, 41 111. App. 3d 837, 354 N.E.2d 448, (lst Dist. 1976) (police officer
who had reasonable grounds to suspect automobile occupants had been involved in an armed
robbery was justified in exiting his squad car with weapon drawn).
65. People v. Nichols, 21 111. App. 3d 432, 315 N.E.2d 663 (4th Dist. 197,4) (defendant
found guilty of aggravated assault for pointing a loaded rifle at an individual who entered
defendant's store and refused to leave); Noschese v. City of New York, 53 App. Div. 2d 566,
384 N.Y.S.2d 822 (1976) (liability found for waiving and pointing loaded revolver at arrestee
despite fact arrest was otherwise lawful).
66. People v. Williams, 57 I11. 2d 239, 311 N.E.2d 681 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026
(1974). In reversing an aggravated assault conviction for drawing and holding a weapon on a
hostile mob of twenty-five persons, the court noted the obvious: if the defendant had waited
until the mob had advanced before drawing the weapon, the risk of violence may have in-
creased.
67. People v. Gatheright, 43 Ill. App. 3d 922, 357 N.E.2d 597 (1st Dist. 1976) (police officer
who reasonably inferred defendant had just committed armed robbery was justified in approach-
ing defendant with drawn gun).
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Even after a person properly decides deadly force is justifiable under one
of the six permissible situations, he is faced with the dilemma of deciding
when to cease firing his weapon. Just as a person may not lawfully use the
alternative of deadly force until all the elements of a particular legal justifica-
tion are present, he may continue firing only until the legal objective has
been accomplished.6 8 It may be impossible, however, for a person to stop
firing a weapon at the exact instant the justification ceases to exist. During a
trial for murder, the evidence in People v. Bailey69 revealed that the defen-
dant had shot the two attackers in a small room four times in two seconds.
The last two shots, according to the medical examiner, were fired after the
assailants had fallen. The appellate court for the first district reversed defen-
dant's conviction, holding that during the two seconds defendant fired he
acted under a reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary. 70
Medical testimony can reveal the exact activity of a suspect at the time of
a bullet's impact. When a firearm is discharged, the suspect's body position
and movement are reflected by the path of the bullet. A pathologist or med-
ical examiner can testify as to the position of the deceased at the exact in-
stant of the shooting. Thus, the curve of a path of a bullet through a body
can indicate whether the deceased was turning toward or away from the
person using deadly force. 71 This is one aid in determining when an ini-
tially justified shooting becomes an illegal act. 72
In sum, before deadly force is justified, the actor must have: (1) a reason-
able belief, (2) that such force is necessary, (3) to prevent some prescribed
illegal act. The preceding discussion has detailed the reasonable belief and
necessity requirements. The following discussion explains the prescribed il-
legal acts against which deadly force may be applied.
68. People v. Limas, 45 I11. App. 643, 359 N.E.2d 1194 (2d Dist. 1977) (the self-defense
justification ceased when the antagonist was disarmed and the defendant no longer feared death
or great bodily harm).
69. 27 I11. App. 128, 326 N.E.2d 550 (1st Dist. 1975).
70. See also People v. Shipp, 52 Ill. App. 3d 470, 367 N.E.2d 966 (2d Dist. 1977) (defend-
ant fired five shots, the last one entering the deceased in the back).
71. See the decisive medical' testimony in People v. Mitchell, 12 I11. App. 3d 960, 299
N.E.2d 472 (1st Dist. 1973) (challenged defendant's version and revealed that deceased was
actually beginning to flee when shot), and that in Fornuto v. Police Board of Chicago, 38 Ill.
App. 3d 950, 349 N.E.2d 521 (1st Dist. 1976) (confirmed police officer's questionable and im-
peached v6rsion).
72. See People v. Shipp, 52 I11. App. 3d 470, 477, 367 N.E.2d 966, 971 (2d Dist. 1977). The
trial court jury found defendant guilty of using unnecessary force in a self-defense situation. The
appellate court stated that, although an initially justified shooting may end illegally once the
victim is disarmed or disabled, the circumstance of self-defense does not require that perfect
judgment be exercised. Id. at 477, N.E.2d at 971. Here, defendant's particular circumstances
warranted a reversal of the lower court's conviction. See also People v. Adams, __ Ill. App. 3d
-, -, 388 N.E.2d 1326, 1329 (2d Dist. 1979).
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Threat of Death or Great Bodily Injury
The first statutory authorization for the use of deadly force allows its use
where there is an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm. 73 Because
of the subjective nature of this justification, both the assailant's and user's
conduct must be examined. For instance, whether or not a warning was
given may be a determinative issue. In an exigent self-defense situation, the
need for immediate action to protect innocent parties may excuse any need
for a warning. 74 Given less perilous self-defense circumstances a jury some-
times examines whether the person shooting first fired a warning shot.75
Unfortunately, however, the "courtesy" of a warning shot can position in-
nocent bystanders perilously close to serious harm. 76 Warning shots (or
shots intended merely to wound) should be justified in the same manner as a
shot intended to kill or cause great bodily harm. Indeed, a police officer is
not required to fire a warning shot before using deadly force to prevent an
arrestee's escape. 77  In fact, official police training wisely counsels against
warning shots. 78 The police training policy is founded on case law indicat-
ing that a large number of bystanders and other police officers have been
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-1 (1977). See People v. Johnson, 2 111. 2d 165, 117 N.E.2d
91 (1954) (a blow to the back of defendant's head held insufficient to support a reasonable belief
of imminent bodily harm); People v. Shields, 18 Iil. App. 3d 1080, 331 N.E.2d 212 (1st Dist.
1974) (a person alone who is attacked by a much larger and unarmed assailant need not wait
until he or she is badly beaten before using deadly force); People v. Williams, 15 I11. App. 3d
303, 304 N.E.2d 178 (4th Dist. 1973) (use of deadly force unjustifed since victim was not in
immediate danger of being pistol whipped). See also W. Farrand and A. Johnson, in Model Test,
note 16 supra, at 27, question 104 (neither the young age of assailant nor the manner of attack
will matter in calculating the risk of imminent bodily harm); C. Cavanaugh, id. at 40 question
140 (a water pistol filled with acid offers a threat of great bodily harm).
74. See W. Farrand, A. Johnson & C. Travelstead, in Model Test, note 16 supra, at 38,
question 135.
75. Griffin, Private Persons Authority in Making Arrest for Felony, to Shoot or Kill Alleged
Felon, Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 1078, 1085 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Griffin] (a warning shot is
one of six factors influencing juries to find in favor of the user of deadly force).
76. See A. HARVIE, THE POLICE OFFICER'S USE OF FORCE: LAW AND LIABILITY 15 (1971);
Cook County Sheriffs Training Bulletin: Police Liability 1-766-5, at 11 (July 1, 1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Training Bulletin]; Comment, The Use of Deadly Force in Arizona by Police Offi-
cers, L. & Soc. ORD. 481, 494 (1973) (warning shots may injure bystanders, prompt suspect to
return fire, unintentionally injure the suspect, or cause other pursuing officers to use deadly
force when not warranted).
77. 73-3 AELE Law Enforcement Legal Defense Manual, Police Use of Firearm--II, at 10
& 19 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Firearms-Il], (published by Americans for Effective Law
Enforcement, Inc., South San Francisco, Calif.).
78. J. Roberts, Legal, Moral and Ethical Aspects of the Use of Firearms by Peace Officers in
the State of Illinois 3 (1976) (Illinois Local Governmental Law Enforcement Officers Training
Board, 301 North Second Street, Springfield, Illinois).
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injured by warning shots. 79 Further, any warning shots fired in the direc-
tion of a person are illegal per se unless the police officer would otherwise
be entitled to shoot that person. 80 Practical considerations suggest that a
verbal warning, when feasible, is a safer alternative and just as effect. To
prevent juries from giving too much weight to the lack of a warning shot,
courts should instruct juries that a warning shot does not have to be fired
prior to the use of deadly force.
Escaping Forcible Felons
Only in the case of the first statutory justification, where death or great
bodily harm is threatened, need there be an actual fear of peril to life. 81 The
remaining five legal justifications permit use of deadly force regardless of
jeopardy to life.
The second legal justification for use of deadly force in Illinois is based on
the presence of a reasonable belief that deadly force is necessary to prevent
an arrest from being defeated by escape.8 2  However, deadly force cannot
be used to effect all arrests. Only where the arrestee is either suspected of
committing a forcible felony, or attempting to escape from a crime by the
use of a deadly weapon, will the use of deadly force be justified under this
rule.8 3  Thus, the type of crime involved (forcible felony versus other
felonies and misdemeanors) in an arrest situation will be controlling.8 4 This
rule results in some incongruities.
Consider the attempted arrest of an automobile thief. The officer would
not be justified in shooting because no forcible felony 85 has been commit-
79. Jones v. Wittenburg Univ., 534 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1976) (suspect killed by warning
shot); Young v. Kelly, 60 Ohio App. 382, 21 N.E.2d 602 (1938) (warning shot struck an innocent
bystander).
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-8 (1977). See People v. Klein, 305 Ill. 141, 137 N.E. 145
(1922). The victim had been escaping from arrest for a misdemeanor when the defendant deputy
sheriff shot at his moving automobile. Although the defendant yelled "halt" before firing, the
Illinois Supreme Court sustained his conviction and reiterated that a police officer can never use
deadly force to effect a misdemeanor arrest. This rule commands regardless of the police of-
ficer's intent or the otherwise impossibility of arrest. See also Locke v. Bralley, 50 S.W.2d 240
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (warning shot that wounded suspect was justified since the situation
warranted use of deadly force); Geiger v. Madden, 58 Pa. Super. 616 (1915) (situation did not
warrant use of deadly force; therefore, warning shot which killed suspect exposed officer to
liability).
81. See note 4 supra.
82. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5 (1977).
83. Id.
84. For example, in Fults v. Pearsall, 408 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Tenn. 1975), a deputy
sheriff shot an escaping misdemeanant and was held liable for violation of plaintiffs civil rights.
85. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5 (1977). The applicable statute defines "f6rcible felony"
to mean treason, murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, robbery, burglary, arson, kidnapping,
aggravated battery, and any other felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or
violence against any individual. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-8 (1978). See Moreland, The Use of
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ted.8 6 However, if the arrestee had broken into the automobile, stolen
some cigarettes and then fled, he would have committed the forcible felony
of burglary. 87  The officer could then justifiably shoot him. Similarly, a high
school student expectorating on a police officer commits the forcible felony
of an aggravated battery.8 8 The insolent youth also could be subjected to
the risk of death if he tried to escape from his crime. Although it would be
unusual to find a police officer applying deadly force in these situations, a
volatile policeman equipped with the authority of this statute is capable of
working serious harm within the ambit of his authority.
Although the application of Illinois law alone leads to incongruous result,
if the use of deadly force is altogether disproportionate to the magnitude of
the offense, it may be argued that an officer can be subject to liability under
federal civil rights laws. 89 For example, it is suggested that if an Illinois
police officer tried to use deadly force against an arsonist who was burning
his own automobile with the intent to defraud an insurer, 90 he may have
Force in Effecting or Reisting Arrest, 33 NEB. L. REV. 408 (1954), where the author points out
that in dealing with a forcible felon's escape, police officers cannot shoot the felon on sight. The
police officer must reasonably believe that the shooting is necessary to prevent the escape. Id.
at 409.
86. The escapee in this situation would be guilty of the crime of theft, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 16-1 (1977), a crime that is not included in the forcible felony definition. Id. § 2-8.
87. See, e.g., People v. Lanpher, 59 I11. App. 3d 825, 376 N.E.2d 433 (3rd Dist. 1978),
where the court held that the theft of a C.B. radio from a vehicle is a burglary.
88. Compare People v. Woolums, 63 I11. App. 3d 602, 379 N.E.2d 1385 (4th Dist. 1978)
(aggravated battery to a police officer must show actual bodily harm), with People v. Lutz, 73
Ill. 2d 204, 383 N.E.2d 171 (1978) (insulting and provoking action on a public street may be an
aggravated battery). For the applicable statute, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-4(b)(8) (1977).
89. See Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, sub non
Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977); Comment, Policeman's Use of Deadly Force in Illinois,
48 CrI-KEN'r L. REV. 252, 259 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Comment]. See also United States v.
Clark, 31 F. 710 (6th Cir. 1887). In Clark, the defendant military officer shot the deceased as
he was attempting to escape custody. Although this case occurred before the enactment of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the court stated that "the fifty-ninth Article of War provides that any officer
accused of a capital crime [is to be brought before] the civil magistrate." Id. at 711. The court
therefore felt authorized to consider civil sanctions for the officer's excessive use of authorized
force.
90. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-8 (1977), includes arson in the list of those crimes classified
as forcible felonies. It is clear from the statutory definition of arson that there would be many
instances in which an attempt to commit arson would not warrant the use of deadly force to
prevent its commission:
Arson. A person commits arson when by means of fire or explosive, he knowingly:
(a) Damages any real property, or any personal property having a value of $150
or more, of another without his consent; or
(b) With intent to defraud an insurer, damages any property or any personal
property having a value of $150 or more.
Property "of another" means a building or other property, whether real or per-
sonal, in which a person other than the offender has an interest which the offender
has no authority to defeat or impair, even though the offender may also have an
interest in the building or property.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 20-1 (1977). See Comment, note 89 supra.
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difficulty justifying his action in a federal court. Arson is a forcible felony
under Illinois law. 9' The police officer is thus statutorily justified in his use
of deadly force to prevent an arsonist's escape. However, in the cir-
cumstances described, a due process issue emerges. An eighth circuit case,
decided on due process grounds, held that a police officer cannot shoot at a
fleeing forcible felon unless the "felon could not be otherwise apprehended
and . . the felon had used deadly force in the commission of the
felony. ... 92 This holding was reversed, however, by the United States
Supreme Court9 3 for lack of standing. No seventh circuit cases have decided
this issue, and other jurisdictions have not followed this decision.9 4  Seven
states, however, have adopted the Model Penal Code provision that requires
that the felon be using deadly force in the commission of his act before the
officer can shoot.9 5
91. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-8 (1977).
92. Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007, 1020 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, sub
nom Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977) (eighteen-year-old suspect shot and killed as he
tried to escape from officer who had caught him breaking into an office).
93. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977). The United States Supreme Court refused to
decide the issue and reversed on grounds that the case was moot since plaintiff had failed to
allege damages and the police officer's belief in the state law was a valid defense of good faith.
94. Qualis v. Parrish, 534 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976) (unsuccessful civil rights action brought
against officers who used deadly force to prevent escape from arrest for felonious assault); Wolfe
v. Thayer, 525 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1976) (parents of a boy shot while fleeing a burglary denied
damages for unconstitutional deprivations of his life); Jones v. Marshall, 383 F.Supp. 358 (D.
Conn. 1974) (statute that allowed officers to shoot a fleeing felon who was a suspected au-
tomobile thief upheld).
95. Seven states have adopted the Model Penal Code's provision, according to Sullivan,
Violation Cases End for Six Officers, 32 ILL. POLICE Ass'N OFFICIAL j., February, 1979, at 24.
The provision reads in pertinent part:
§ 3.07 Use of Force in Law Enforcement
(1) USE OF FORCE JUSTIFIABLE TO EFFECT AN ARREST. Subject to the
provisions of this Section and of Section 3.09, the use of force upon or toward the
person of another is justifiable when the actor is making or assisting in making an
arrest and the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary to effect a
lawful arrest.
(2) LIMITATIONS OF THE USE OF FORCE
(a) The use of force is not justifiable under this section unless:
(i) the actor makes known the purpose of the arrest or believes it is
otherwise known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be ar-
rested; and
(ii) when the arrest is made under a warrant, the warrant is valid or be-
lieved by the actor to be valid.
(b) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless:
(i) the arrest is for a felony;* and
(ii) the person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as peace officer or is
assisting a person whom he believes to be authorized to act as a peace officer; and
(iii) the actor believes that the force employed creates no substantial risk
of injury to innocent persons; and
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:701
Moreover, official police training policy describes at least eight factors that
govern the determination of when it is necessary 96 to use deadly force to
stop the escape of a forcible felon. Many of these standards have been used
to interpret the statute by the Illinois courts. Police officers are not expected
to exhaust a checklist before shooting, but public policy demands a cogni-
zance of these factors. First, the age of the suspect has importance. 97 Sec-
ond, the relative size of the individuals bears a direct relationship to the
level of force that may be practically and legally required. 98  A more physi-
cally imposing police officer probably would be expected to subdue a resist-
ing criminal without resorting to deadly force. 99 Third, the availability of
assistance is another controlling factor in deciding whether to use deadly
force. Deadly force cannot be justified when the felon may be as easily ap-
prehended by seeking available assistance.100 Fourth, the known criminal
history of an offender is important, especially that part revealing prior as-
saults on police officers. 10 1 Fifth, whether the suspect was known to be
(iv) the actor believes that:
(1) The crime for which the arrest is made involved conduct including
the use of threatened use of deadly force; or
(3) there is substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause
death or serious bodily harm or his apprehension will be delayed.
* In Illinois, this would be changed to "forcible felony."
ALl MODEL PENAL CODE §. 3.07 (1962).
96. See Model Test, supra note 16, at 29, question 110.
97. See People v. Muldrow, 30 Ill. App. 3d 209, 332 N.E.2d 664 (1st Dist. 1975) (self-
defense argument more difficult when defendant and deceased are same age); People v. Givens,
26 Ill. 2d 371, 186 N.E.2d 225 (1962) (elderly man justified in using gun in self-defense due to
fear of physical harm from young, robust assailant).
98. People v. Givens, 26 Ill. 2d 371, 186 N.E.2d 225 (1962) (held age and size of parties
important in calculating whether a self-defense shooting was justified); People v. Kelly, 40 Ill.
App. 3d 315, 352 N.E.2d 240 (1st Dist. 1976) (physical stature of victim is element to be
considered in determining whether deadly force is justified); People v. Muldrow, 30 I1. App.
3d 209, 332 N.E.2d 664 (1st Dist. 1975) (where defendant outweighed decedent by 80 pounds,
it was more difficult to show self defense).
99. See Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353 So.2d 969 (La. 1977) (factors to be considered in
determining whether a shooting in self-defense was justified include: known character of arres-
tee, nature of the offense, physical size, strength and weaponry of the officers compared to the
arrestee, and chances of escape and alternative methods of arrest). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 132, Comment c (1965) (relative strength and size of officer and suspect is factor
when determining reasonableness of force used).
100. Schnepf v. Grubb, 125 Il. App. 2d 432, 261 N.E.2d 47 (4th Dist. 1970) (availability of
assistance considered when determining reasonableness of force used). See Dyson v. Schmidt,
109 N.W.2d 262 (Minn. 1961) (policeman held liable for accidentally shooting bystander during
gun battle in crowded movie theater because suspect could have been more safely apprehended
had the officer called in available assistance).
101. Schnepf v. Grubb, 125 II. App. 2d 432, 261 N.E.2d 47 (4th Dist. 1970) (a policeman,
aware of a deceased's prior bad conduct and personal vendetta against that policeman, was
justified in reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary). People v. Brumbeloe, 97 III. App.
2d 370, 240 N.E.2d 150 (1st Dist. 1968), and People v. Honey, 69 Ill. App. 2d 429, 217 N.E.2d
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armed is considered.1 0 2 A suspect motioning toward a pocket in which he is
known to carry a weapon increases his chances of being shot by the officer.
Sixth, the place of arrest can be a factor. Is the suspect fleeing into a dead-
end alley or into an unfamiliar neighborhood?103  Seventh, the presence of
the suspect's companions can have a legal as well as practical sig-
nificance.10 4  Lastly, differences in the available lighting present entirely dif-
ferent tactical situations.' 0 5 At night, a fleeing felon can kill or escape more
readily than during the day.
As in self-defense situations, the police officer is protected if his belief in
the necessity of preventing an escape is reasonable, even if there exists an
erroneous perception of fact. In Pearson v. Taylor, 10 6 decided under a simi-
lar statute in another jurisdiction, a nocturnal police search for two murder
suspects, known to be heavily armed, resulted in the discovery of two men
walking along a road. The officers pulled the squad car thirty feet behind the
suspects and flashed the headlights upon the men. Twice the officers told
them to approach with their hands uplifted. The suspects ignored the com-
mand and approached in a crouched position. The officers then fired upon
them. Unknown to the officers at the time, the suspects were unarmed, had
just telephoned the police, and were in fact surrendering. The court held
that, under the circumstances, the officers' beliefs were reasonable and justi-
fiable. Similarly, as long as the police officer has a reasonable belief that
deadly force is necessary to prevent the escape of the forcible felon, he is
protected even though no felony has been committed in fact. 107
371 (1st Dist. 1966), are two cases which state that prior assaults with deadly weapons by
deceased on defendant may cause defendant to reasonably believe deadly force is necessary to
defend himself.
102. People v. Stapleton, 300 I11. 471, 133 N.E. 224 (1921) (when deceased pulled gun first,
the defendant was justified in using deadly force and shooting deceased); People v. Honey, 69
I1l. App. 2d 429, 217 N.E.2d 371 (1st Dist. 1966) (deceased had previously pulled gun from
pocket when attacking defendant and when he repeated the same motion for his pocket several
days after the first incident, the defendant was justified in using deadly force).
103. Martyn v. Donlin, 151 Conn. 402, 198 A.2d 700 (1964) (defendant officer had reasonable
belief to think deadly force was necessary to effect the arrest when he had no knowledge of the
neighborhood into which the arrestee was fleeing).
104. People v. Fort, 91 I. App. 2d 212, 234 N.E.2d 384 (1968). Police officers undertook to
arrest defendant in the presence of other hostile individuals. An officer testified that the indi-
viduals were attempting to remove defendant from custody. The court held that the officers were
therefore justified in using any force necessary to effect the arrest.
105. See Martyn v. Donlin, 151 Conn. 402, 198 A.2d 700 (1964). See also R. BROOKS, OF-
FICER DOWN, CODE THREE 95, 242 (1975) [hereinafter cited as R. BROOKS] for a detailing of
the large percentage of police officers killed under poor lighting conditions.
106. 116 So. 2d 833 (La. 1959).
107. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5 (1977). See Moreland, The Use of Force in Effectuating or
Resisting Arrest, 33 NEB. L. REv. 408, 409-12 (1954). This rule is not true, however, in all
jurisdictions. See also Petrie v. Cartwright, 114 Ky. 103, 70 S.W. 297 (1902); Commonwealth v.
Duerr, 158 Pa. Super. 484, 45 A.2d 235 (1946) (despite officer's reasonable belief that fleeing
suspect was a felon, officer is not entitled to use deadly force to apprehend suspect); Waite,
Some Inadequacies in the Law of Arrest, 29 MICH. L. REv. 448, 462 (1931).
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Although the police officer is protected on the basis of his reasonable be-
lief, the public expects him to be more careful than the private citizen in
using deadly force. For example, long-standing police policy requires officers
to be patient if the success of the arrest will not be imperiled. It is prefera-
ble that an arresting officer delay the actual moment of custody rather than
cause unnecessary harm through an impulsive use of force.108 Also, a police
officer must use reasonable efforts to apprehend the suspect before he
employs deadly force. 10 9
Typically, a verbal command or warning by the pursuing police officer
satisfies the "reasonable efforts" requirement. In Fornuto v. Police Board of
Chicago,110 Officer Fornuto avoided dismissal from the police force because
he shouted, "Halt, police," before shooting a fleeing felon. In foot-pursuit of
a robbery suspect, the officer yelled his warning twice. The suspect whirled
around with a knife, lunged, and turned as if to run. The officer shot the
suspect in the back. In ordering the reinstatement of the officer, the appel-
late court for the first district noted that the officer had expended all reason-
able alternatives to prevent the suspect's escape, and further held that a
warning shot was unnecessary.
When the officer knows the identity of an escaping forcible felon, an addi-
tional question concerning the propriety of his use of deadly force arises.
Due to the lack of case law in this area, the police officer lacks clear
guidelines for his behavior. For example, suppose a police officer responds
to a burglary-in-progress call. As he arrives at the scene of the crime, a well-
known burglar observes him and flees from a basement window. The police
officer recognizes the burglar and yells a command to halt. This particular
burglar may never have been known to carry a weapon.1" Does the knowl-
edge of the burglar's identity preclude the use of deadly force because an
officer could make an arrest at a later date in a more controlled environ-
ment? Some authorities argue that positive knowledge of the identity of a
fleeing forcible felon precludes the otherwise permissible use of deadly force
because further attempts to arrest may be possible. 1 12
108. See Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353 So. 2d 969 (La. 1977). The court stated that the
amount of force used to effect the arrest must be tested under the "reasonable force" standard.
Id. at 972. The force used in the case before the court exceeded reasonableness because "[tihe
officers could have delayed the arrest without great risk." Id. at 974.
109. Fornuto v. Police Board of Chicago, 38 Ill. App. 3d 950, 349 N.E.2d 521 (1st Dist.
1976) (police officer avoided dismissal from police force by yelling "halt" before shooting);
Krantz v. O'Neil, 99 I11. App. 2d 179, 189, 240 N.E.2d 180, 185 (1st Dist. 1968) (court in-
structed the jury that reasonable efforts to apprehend the suspect must be made prior to the
execution of justified deadly force). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 131 (1965)
(deadly force may be used once the person reasonably believes that the arrest cannot otherwise
be reasonably effected) (emphasis added).
110. 38 I11. App. 3d 950, 349 N.E.2d 521 (1st Dist. 1976).
111. Example taken from Model Test, supra note 16, at 21, question 82.
112. C. Travelstead & A. Johnson, id. at 21, question 82.
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This interpretation wrongly engrafts upon the statute the additional ele-
ment of a duty to desist and delay even if all other elements justifying the
use of deadly force are present. Eliminating the arresting officer's discretion
and requiring him to delay the arrest upon recognition of the arrestee could
endanger innocent citizens. This danger would be present because the arres-
tee would be encouraged to avoid subsequent apprehension, and because
prosecution would be prejudiced through the loss of some evidence obtainable
only through immediate apprehension of the suspect. The plain and or-
dinary interpretation of the statute permits the use of deadly force irrespec-
tive of the knowledge of a suspect's identity, provided the suspect is defeat-
ing the arrest by escape and all other elements of the justification are pres-
ent. In all cases, it is clear that if the officer does not know the arrestee's
identity or whether the arrestee is armed, the officer can justifiably use
deadly force. 113
Arrestee's Escape with Deadly Weapons
When the arrestee is attempting to escape by the use of a deadly weapon,
the police officer's alternatives are more defined."14 A police officer is not
required to chase and disarm one who is resisting arrest, but has the option
of using deadly force if the arrest cannot be made with diligence and cau-
tion. 115 If the arrestee is armed with a deadly weapon, a clear indication of
danger is present. Such an exigency allows the officer to act whether or not
the offender actually has used the weapon. The normal inference, that the
arrestee intends to use the weapon to defeat the arrest, is thus given conclu-
sive effect. 116
When the option to use deadly force is available, the decision confronting
the officer is one of timing. At what instant in the sequence of events does
shooting an armed, fleeing arrestee become legally justified? Under common
law, the police officer need not withhold fire until the arrestee shoots first.
Rather, the officer can shoot when the arrestee commits any overt act which
indicates an attempt to use the weapon. 117  Consider the dilemma that
might face police officers arresting a non-forcible felon in a house. The sus-
pect, facing a large prison term, flees the rear of the house with a pistol in
hand. After ignoring repeated commands to halt, the armed felon turns
toward a large tree. The officers can reasonably assume that the suspect in-
113. Id.
114. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5(a)(1) & (2) (1978).
115. Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IOWA L. REv. 201, 268 (1940) [hereinafter cited as
Perkins]. The author quotes from an old decision which stated a view that still prevails today:
"[If the victim retains] his purpose of resisting to the death, and to make a running fight, the
officer and his men [are] not bound to risk their lives by rushing on a desperate man, who still
[keeps] his gun in his hands." State v. Garret, 60 N.C. 85, 86 (1863).
116. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5 committee comment (Smith-Hurd 1972).
117. See Perkins, supra note 115, at 285, where the author discusses this conclusion found in
Hammond v. State, 147 Ala. 79, 41 So. 761 (1906).
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tends to fire at them from behind the shelter of the tree. 118  Depending on
the physical location and personnel variables, the officers could justifiably
shoot the arrestee at any time after the arrestee turned toward the tree.
Frequently, police officers are faced with near-borderline situations in
which deadly force is not yet justified. Consider the officer who shoots a
person he is attempting to arrest for the misdemeanor of carrying a con-
cealed weapon. Because the crime is not a forcible felony, and the arrestee
is not escaping by the use of the deadly weapon, the shooting would not be
justified. 119 Thus, mere possession of a weapon is insufficient to trigger the
use of deadly force. 1 20  However, as stated earlier, if the arrestee makes an
overt act to use the weapon, such as drawing or pointing the weapon at the
officer, the use of deadly force will be justified. Therefore, the misdemean-
ant who flees from arrest wielding a gun could be the target of an officer's
shot.
Escape Endangering Human Life
A police officer is also statutorily authorized to use deadly force in order to
prevent an arrestee's escape if the arrestee in any way "indicates he will
endanger human life or inflict bodily harm unless arrested without de-
lay." 121 For example, an arrestee fleeing from an officer in a high speed
chase endangers pedestrians. If the pursuing officer could minimize the risk
to pedestrians by shooting the driver, he may use deadly force.122
Preventing Forcible Felonies or Dwelling Felonies
Two other Illinois statutes permit the use of deadly force: 1) where it is
necessary to prevent the commission of a forcible felony, 123 and 2) where it
is necessary to prevent the commission of a felony in a dwelling.124 Since
an unauthorized entry into a dwelling with the intent to commit a felony
constitutues the forcible felony of burglary, these justifications are similar.
They authorize the policeman to pursue both the arsonist of a home 125 and
118. See Bailey v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 731, 221 S.W.2d 693 (1949) (defendant justified
in shooting subsequent to discharge of decedent's gun and, as a police officer, justified in using.
whatever force necessary to effect an arrest); West Virginia v. Laing, 133 F. 887 (4th Cir. 1904)
(affirmed holding that police officer's firing on an armed fleeing suspect was done as a lawful
discharge of duty).
119. See ILL. lEv. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5(a)(2) (1977).
120. C. Travelstead & A. Johnson, in Model Test, supra note 16, at 24, question 93.
121. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5(a)(2) (1977).
122. A. HARVIE, supra note 76, at 11.
123. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 7-1, -3 (1977).
124. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-2(b) (1977).
125. See A. HARVIE, supra note 76, at 9.
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the residential burglar. 1 26  Consider the felon who is guilty of criminal
property damge in excess of $150.00.127 If he flees and refuses to stop on
command, the necessity requirement for these statutes is satisfied. If such
activity occurs in a dwelling, all elements required for a justifiable homicide
are present. It should be noted, however, that a mere trespass will never
justify the taking of a human life. 1 28  The statute requires a trespass to a
dwelling and the commission of a felony after a refusal to stop before deadly
force is justified.
Illinois courts have required these additional elements-trespass to a
dwelling and a commission of a felony-to be clearly present to support the
use of deadly force. For instance, where an owner's premises contain both a
store and an upstairs dwelling area, the owner may not threaten an irate
customer with the use of deadly force in order to remove the customer from
the store. 129 The significance of the requirement that the offense be com-
mitted in a dwelling is graphically illustrated in the case of People v. Dil-
lard. 130 In that case, the proprietor of a gas station in a high crime area
discovered, as he was leaving with the day's receipts, three trespassers be-
hind the station. When he fired at the trespassers, they drew illegally pos-
sessed firearms and returned the fire. The appellate court for the fifth dis-
trict stated that the proprietor's authority to use reasonable force to remove
the trespassers did not include the right to use deadly force against mere
trespassers. Thus, the court held that, despite the trespassers' illegal posses-
sion of firearms, they were justified in returning the proprietor's fire.' 3 '
Prevention of Assault After Riotous Entry
Pursuant to the fifth Illinois justification, deadly force may be used to
prevent an assault that occurs after a violent riotous entry into a dwell-
ing.132 For example, in People v. Eatman,133 tenants closed the door on
the landlady and her bodyguard, who had come to collect the rent. The
management forcibly kicked the door in, refused to leave, and struck the
residents. The tenants responded with deadly force. The Illinois Supreme
Court ruled that the occupant of a dwelling need not have a belief of peril to
126. See People v. Post, 39 I11. 2d 101, 233 N.E.2d 565 (1968) (involuntary manslaughter
conviction for shooting a fleeing prowler reversed for failure to establish that defendant's act was
reckless). But see People v. Smith, 404 I11. 125, 88 N.E.2d 444 (1949) (shooting unjustified since
building was open to the public).
127. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 21-1 (1977).
128. People v. Givens, 26 Ill. 2d 371, 186 N.E.2d 225 (1962); People v. Osborne, 278 Ill.
104, 115 N.E. 890 (1917).
129. People v. Nichols, 21 III. App. 3d 432, 315 N.E.2d 663 (4th Dist. 1974).
130. 5 I11. App. 3d 896, 284 N.E.2d 490 (5th Dist. 1972).
131. Id. at 901, 284 N.E.2d at 494.
132. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-2(2) (1977).
133. 405 Ill. 491, 91 N.E.2d 387 (1951).
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justify the use of deadly force. In holding that the bodyguard's death was
justified, the court stated that a strong forcible entry, a show of violence, and
a refusal to desist were sufficient to justify the use of deadly force.1 34
Escape From Penal Institution
The sixth and last Illinois justification applies only to law enforcement of-
ficers. They may use deadly force to prevent an escape from a penal institu-
tion. 1 3 5 The statute requires only a reasonable belief that the escaping pris-
oner was lawfully detained. 136 The police officer need not inquire into the
nature of pending charges before deciding to use deadly force. Even if the
officer later discovers that the prisoner was held on a mere disorderly con-
duct charge, the shooting was still justifiable. However, if the firing police
officer knew that the prisoner was awaiting trial for less than a forcible
felony, he could face a federal civil rights action.1 37 Further, once the pris-
oner completes his escape, deadly force cannot be applied pursuant to this
last statutory justification. 138
POSSIBLE LEGISLATION
As this Article has detailed, the criminal law in Illinois permits a broad
use of deadly force. This year, the Illinois Legislature is considering narrow-
ing the scope of a police officer's right to use deadly force. In particular, it is
134. People v, Givens, 26 III. 2d 371, 186 N.E.2d 225 (1962).
135. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-9(b) (1977). See also id. § 1003-6-4(b):
If one or more committed persons injures or attempts to injure in a violent manner
any employee, officer, guard or an), other committed person or damages or attempts
to damage any building or workshop, or any appurtenances thereof, or attempts to
escape, or disobeys or resists any lawful command, the employees, officers and
guards shall use all suitable means to defend themselves, to enforce the observance
of discipline, to secure the persons of the offenders, and prevent such attempted
violence or escape; and said employees, officers or guards, or any of them, shall, in
the attempt to prevent the escape of any such person, or in attempting to retake
any such person who has escaped, or in attempting to prevent or suppress violence
by a committed person against another person, a riot, revolt, mutiny or insurrec-
tion, be justified in the use of force, including force likely to cause death or great
bodily harm under Section 7-8 of the Criminal Code of 1961 which he reasonably
believed necessary.
136. Id. § 7-9(b). See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5 committee comment (Smith-Hurd 1972),
where the commentator points out that a prison guard is not expected to know the history of a
prisoner who is trying to escape.
137. See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
138. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5 committee comment (Smith-Hurd 1972). See FISHER,
LAws OF ARRESTS §§ 25-31 (1967). The author points out that a person is not an escapee until
he has been arrested and reduced to confinement. Thus, at common law, a person fleeing to
avoid initial custody is not an escapee.
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examining the officer's right to shoot fleeing forcible felons who have com-
mitted non-residential burglaries. 1 39
Six bills were introduced. The most restrictive bill limits the use of deadly
force to crimes involving the use or threat of deadly force and to situations
in which a delay in the arrest would create a substantial risk that the suspect
would cause death or serious bodily injury. Compromise positions taken by
other bills exclude burglaries and non-residentil burglaries from the forcible
felony justification. Proponents of the compromise bills cite six cases in
Chicago in which suspects had been shot and it later was determined that
the deceased suspect had been unarmed. 140  However, the proponents over-
look the rationale that has long supported the existing law. The proposed
legislative restrictions are contrary to the majority rule in many states having
similar statutes. 14 1 Other states go further than Illinois and extend the right
to shoot fleeing felons to citizens.1 4 2
The proposed restrictions, moreover, would encourage a felon to attempt
escape. Severe restrictions on a policeman's authority to use deadly force
would jeopardize his effectiveness in responding to a felony-in-progress call.
He might as well go "wearing track shoes and armed only with water pis-
tols." 143 In the final analysis, the loss of police officers' lives must be bal-
anced against the loss of fleeing felons' lives. Statistically, the largest cate-
gory of activity engaged in by police officers at the time of being killed on
139. See Bagley, supra note 11. See also Sullivan, Violation Cases End for Six Officers, 32
ILL. POLICE ASS'N OFFICIAL J., Feb. 1979, at 24, 24-25.
140. Id.
141. ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.090 (1970); ARiz. REv. STAT. § 13-411 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. 9
41-2238 (1964); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 196, 197 (West 1969); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-3-101,
18-1-707 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-22 (West 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.02
(West 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-901 (1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 703-307 (1976); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 19-610 (1947); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 7-5 (1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 804.8
(1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3215 (1970); Ky. REV. STAT. § 431.025 (1974); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 220 (West 1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.33 (1945); MISS. CODE ANN. §
97-3-15 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 544.190, 559.040 (Vernon 1969); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§§ 94-2512, 94-2513 (1947); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.140 (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 594,4
(1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-6 (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 732 (West 1951); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 161.235 (1974); GEN. LAWS OF R.I., § 12-7-9 (1969); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 22-18-2 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-808 (1975); TEXAS CODE CIM. PRoc. art. 15.25
(Vernon 1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-11 (1978) (warrant required); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 13,
9 2305 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.050 (1961).
142. Commonwealth v. Klein, 372 Mass. 823, 363 N.E.2d 1313 (1977) (citizen may shoot
fleeing felons who have engaged in crimes which threaten death or great bodily harm-rule
applied retroactively to a citizen who shot the fleeing burglar of a business); Commonwealth v.
Chermansky, 430 Pa. 170, 242 A.2d 237 (1968) (citizen may shoot fleeing felon who has commit-
ted treason, murder, voluntary manslaughter, mayhem, arson, robbery, common law rape,
common law burglary, kidnapping, assault with intent to murder, rape or robbery, or a felony
that normally causes or threatens death or great bodily harm).
143. Peterson v. City of Long Beach, 72 Cal. App. 3d 852, 140 Cal. Rptr. 401, 417 (1977),
rev'd, 155 Cal. Rptr. 360, 594 P.2d 477 (1979).
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duty is that of responding to burglary- and robbery-in-progress calls. 144
Prohibition of the right to use deadly force against forcible felons would
inhibit police officers' readiness to use their firearms and would increase the
risk of their being injured. Undoubtedly, the number of police officers killed
in pursuit of felons would increase if the law is further restricted.
Traditionally, the strongest curb on the illegal use of deadly force has
been the potential civil liabilities of the police officer. The police officer's
civil liability for the improper use of deadly force arose not as a challenge to
the existing law justifying the use of deadly force, but rather as a response to
the harm incurred by the unintentional shooting of innocent persons. Be-
cause the measure of civil liability parallels the criminal law of unjustifiable
use of deadly force, 145 the potential for civil liability is a tremendous im-
petus for self-restraint.
Despite popular conception, in many typical pursuit situations, the rank-
and-file police officer is often a poor marksman. 146 Contrary to Hollywood
representations, a police officer has a greater chance of being shot by the
criminal than of killing the criminal at whom he is shooting. 147 Currently,
the typical required firearms training consists of exercises in shooting approx-
imately fifty shots at a brightly lit target under perfect shooting condi-
tions. 148 This is inadequate because none of the required training gives the
police officer comprehensive instructions on how to avoid being shot or on
how to conduct himself in a tactical shooting situation. 149  Generally, these
critical decisions are left to the untrained police officer to learn experien-
tially. If the training were expanded to include firearms tactics and to simu-
late combat firing under poor lighting and shooting conditions, the officers
could then acquire abilities that would aid them in self-defense. Also, un-
necessary shooting potentially would be avoided as a result of the officers'
increased confidence.
144. R. BROOKS, supra note 105, at 243-44.
145. La Monte v. City of Belleville, 41 I11. App. 3d 697, 703, 355 N.E.2d 70, 76 (5th Dist.
1976).
146. See A. HARVIE, supra note 76, at 15, where it is stated that "[ilt is difficult, if not
impossible to shoot accurately at a moving vehicle, especially from a moving vehicle."
147. R. DALEY, TARGET BLUE (1978). In 1970 in New York, the police had a total of 634
shooting incidents. Six hundred fifty-nine police officers fired 1643 shots, including 183 warning
shots, of which only 436 shots hit their targets. Of these 643 incidents, seven officers died, 242
were injured and 19 had their firearms taken away from them. Fifty criminals were killed and
212 criminals were wounded. Most of these shootings occurred at night. Almost all of these
incidents occurred within seven yards and lasted under two seconds. Only 75 incidents were a
Hollywood type gun fight with the officer and criminals exchanging multiple shots.
148. Id. at 102. See also Illinois Local Governmental Law Enforcement Officers Training
Board, Illinois Firearms Training Program and Standard Police Combat Course (January, 1976)
(published by the Illinois Local Governmental Law Enforcement Officers' Training Board, 301
N. Second Street, Springfield, Illinois) [hereinafter cited as Illinois Training Program], as it
pertains to P.A. 79-652; Moline Police Dept., Moline Police Dept. Combat Firing Range Rules
(August, 1979).
149. Illinois Training Program, supra note 148.
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Some jurisdictions have imposed civil sanctions against police departments
for failure to provide appropriate firearms training for their police officer. In
the New York Police Department, a veteran police officer of nine years con-
sistently met departmental qualifications with his weapon. Upon surprising
two armed robbers from behind, he fired at them from a distance of less
than eight feet. The officer missed both felons, hitting and killing the victim
of the intended robbery with four of the six shots fired.1 5 0  The court im-
posed liability upon not only the police officer, but also upon his supervisors
for failure to train the responsible officer adequately. The New York courts
have further imposed liability for the failure to provide firearms training to
state troopers on moving silhouette targets. 151 The Illinois Courts have
begun to follow this trend and have allowed recovery against a city for the
failure to train a police officer adequately.152
Some police chiefs and sheriffs, in order to avoid costly litigation and ex-
pensive judgments, have enacted safety and policy rules for their depart-
ments concerning firearms. These regulations can be tailored to fit the re-
quirements of the police department, the level of training and proficiency of
the officers, and the experiences of the department. Most of these regula-
tions restrict the police action more than does the criminal law.15a Although
these regulations may be more stringent than the state law, police officers
may be discharged pursuant to the requirements of the particular depart-
ment. 154  Because they emanate from a source of authority that has a more
direct relevancy for a police officer than a potential liability action in which
the governmental authority may eventually have to pay, these regulations
often have a more powerful deterrent effect.
Unfortunately, trial courts have admitted these restrictive departmental
rules into evidence in civil cases 155 as probative evidence of a violation of a
duty to the public' 56 and a violation of an individual department's firearm
regulation. Such rules have contributed toward sizeable judgments even
150. Meinstinsky v. City of New York, 128 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1954), rev'd, 285 App. Div. 1153,
140 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1955), affd, 309 N.Y. 998 132 N.E.2d 900 (1956).
151. Piatkowski v. State, 43 Misc.2d 424, 251 N.Y.S.2d 354, (1964).
152. Peters v. Bellinger, 22 Ill. App. 2d 105, 159 N.E.2d 528 (4th Dist. 1959), rev'd. on
other grounds, 19 I11. 2d 367, 166 N.E.2d 581 (1960) (liability had been based not only on a lack
of training but police officer had a felony conviction and had been involved in many street
brawls.)
153. 73-2 AELE Legal Defense Manual, Police Use of Firearms-I, at 3 (1973) (published by
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., South San Francisco, Calif.); Firearmas-l,
supra note 77, at 19.
154. See Chastian v. Orlando Civil Serv. Comm'n, 327 So. 2d 230 (Fla. App. 1976) (court
affirmed dismissal of defendant who had exceeded strict departmental standards for the justified
use of deadly force).
155. Krantz v. O'Neil, 99 I11. App. 2d 179, 240 N.E.2d 180 (1st Dist. 1968) (firearms regula-
tions admissible on behalf of defendant police officer).
156. Sauls v. Hults, 304 F. Supp. 124, 130 (E.D. La. 1969).
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when the shooting is justified under state law.157 Unless the legislature acts
to prohibit the admissibility of police regulations in civil liability lawsuits,
police departments effectively will be deterred from promulgating safety and
policy guidelines.
In response to judicial intervention into issues concerning the negligent
use of justifiable deadly force, the Illinois Legislature has acted twice. First,
the Illinois Police training Act was amended to require all full-time police
officers appointed after January 1, 1976, successfully to complete a pre-
scribed basic training course within the first six months of their initial
employment or to forfeit their positions. 158 Second, part-time police officers
are prohibited from carrying firearms unless they successfully complete a
twenty-four hour course 159 requiring the proficient use of firearms with
stationary targets under the control situation of a police range, and the study
of the legal and moral ramifications of the use of deadly force.160  These
laws indicate an attempt to establish minimum guidelines for the training of
police officers and a desire to insulate police chiefs and supervisors from
vicarious civil liability. It is hoped that through concise standard guidelines
every officer can be trained to the same level of minimum proficiency. Non-
compliance with these training laws could result in the imposition of strict
liability against a municipality or, at the least, be persuasive proof of liability
for the negligent use of deadly force by a police officer. 6 '
The next step in the law of civil liability concerning police officers would
be to allow recovery for the wrongful act of a police officer when the officer
fails to stop the illegal use of force of another officer (of the same rank or
lower) with whom he is working. For example, suppose two Illinois officers
pursued a suspect in a vehicle for a misdemeanor violation. The fleeing
driver hits a tree, and when he attempts to run, one officer wrongfully
shoots and kills him. In a similar situation, both officers were sued, 162 but
the first district appellate court failed to resolve a crucial issue: is an officer
who is in a position to prevent the illegal use of deadly force liable for his
157. See Crundt v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal. 3d 575, 468 P.2d 825, 86 Cal. Rptr. 465
(1970). A police training manual outlined restrictive justifications for the use of deadly force.
The court held that the manual had been improperly excluded from evidence at the trial and
that plaintiff was deprived of a crucial theory in her case because of its exclusion. Contra, City
of St. Petersburg v. Reed, 330 So. 2d 256 (Fla. App. 1976) (police department cannot impose
additional civil liability on their police officers by adopting voluntary restrictive guidelines on
the use of deadly force).
158. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 506, 508, 508.1 (1977) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 1,
1975, P.A. 79-720, 1975 I11. Laws, which amended §§ 1, 6, & 8 of the Illinois Police Training
Act of 1965 and added § 8.1).
159. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 501, 512 (1977) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 29, 1975,
P.A. 79-652, 1975 II1. Laws).
160. Illinois Training Program, supra note 148.
161. 51226 Op. Att'y Gen. (April 7, 1977).
162. Young v. Gossling, 23 I11. App. 2d 426, 163 N.E.2d 532 (1st Dist. 1960).
[Vol. 28:701
DEADLY FORCE
failure to do so? Indeed, is an officer who explicitly encourages an unjus-
tiffied or excessive use of force liable for the results of his encouragement? A
policy of coliability would discourage improper use of firearms because
police officers would have a duty to restrain each other before the instant of
shooting.
CONCLUSION
Illinois statutes describe six instances in which police officers are justified
in using deadly force. Despite repeated judicial refinement and interpreta-
tion of these six provisions, several areas of legal uncertainty remain. An
off-duty police officer still cannot be sure whether it is illegal to carry a gun
outside of his jurisdiction, or whether he can shoot at a fleeing forcible felon
whom he recognizes, or to what extent he may be held liable for shooting at
fleeing forcible felons. With regard to the plaintiff's lawyer, he has available
expanded legal theories with which to sue not only the officer, but also the
officer's supervisors and municipality for the failure to provide sophisticated
firearms training. Despite repeated public outcry, the courts have en-
trenched the police officer's rights to use deadly force. However, even with
statutory modification and legal refinement, the police officer will always
have the capability to be "judge, jury, and executioner" in these instances.
Therefore, the answer to cries of abuse lies in improving officer training.
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